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Evaluating Accountable Care Organizations is difficult because there is a great deal of heterogeneity in 
terms of their reimbursement incentives and other programmatic features.  We examine how variation in 
reimbursement incentives and administration among two Medicaid managed care plans impacts 
utilization and spending.  We use a quasi-experimental approach exploiting the timing and county-
specific implementation of Medicaid managed care mandates in two contiguous regions of Kentucky.  We 
find large differences in the relative success of each plan in reducing utilization and spending that are 
likely driven by important differences in plan design.  The plan that capitated primary care physicians and 
contracted out many administrative responsibilities to an experienced managed care organization 
achieved significant reductions in outpatient and professional utilization. The plan that opted for a fee-for-
service reimbursement scheme with a group withhold and handled administration internally saw a much 
more modest reduction in outpatient utilization and an increase in professional utilization. 
 
JEL classification:  I18; I38; J13 
Keywords:   Medicaid; Managed Care; Child Health 
                                                          
*
 Marton: Georgia State University, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992; 404 - 413 
- 0256 (p); 404 - 413 - 0145 (f); marton@gsu.edu. Yelowitz: University of Kentucky, Department of Economics, 335 
Business and Economics Building, Lexington, KY 40506-0034; 859-257-7634 (p); 859-323-1920 (f); 
aaron@uky.edu. Talbert: University of Kentucky, College of Pharmacy, 237 BPC, 789 S. Limestone St., Lexington, 
KY 40536-0596; 859-323-7141 (p); 859-323-0069 (f); jtalb1@email.uky.edu. 
 
We would like to thank Tania Barham, Glenn Blomquist, J.S. Butler, Julia Costich, Janet Currie, Al Headen, Lorens 
Helmchen, Inas Rashad Kelly, Carlos Lamarche, Adriana Lleras-Muney, Jim Ziliak, participants at the 2008 ASHE 
conference, the 2008 AHEC conference, the 2010 SHESG conference, the 2010 EEA meetings, seminar participants 
at the University of Kentucky, Emory University, Western Kentucky University, and Georgia State University, the 
staff at the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and two anonymous referees for their valuable 
comments. We would also like to thank Gao Liu, Erin Coffman, T.J. Christian, Jamie Turner, and Subha Basu for 
their work as research assistants. Any errors are, of course, our own. This project was supported with a grant from 
the UK Center for Poverty Research through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, grant number 5 ASPE417-03 as well as a Georgia State University 
Faculty Research Initiation Grant. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and 
should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of the UKCPR or any agency of the Federal 
government. 
 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 Although the implementation of the key features of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is 
well underway, policymakers continue to struggle with the best health care finance and delivery 
system to achieve the “Triple Aim” of improved quality of care, improved population health, and 
reduced cost (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington (2008)).  This is especially true among state 
Medicaid programs, as many states have recently expanded their Medicaid programs in January 
2014, despite concerns about the impact of the expansion on state budgets.
1
   
 One relatively new approach to this problem is to create what are known as Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs), which can be generally defined as coordinated networks of medical 
providers that assume the risk for the quality and total cost of care for their patients (Burns and 
Pauly (2013)).  As discussed in Fisher et al. (2012), much like more traditional managed care 
organizations (MCOs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), or integrated delivery 
networks, ACOs may differ both in terms of specific contract characteristics and the populations 
they serve, with current ACOs providing care through contracts for Medicaid, Medicare, private 
payers, and different combinations of these groups. 
 One challenge associated with evaluating the success of ACOs, MCOs, or integrated 
delivery networks, is the fact that there may be a great deal of heterogeneity across these 
networks / organizations / plans in terms of their reimbursement incentives and other key 
programmatic features (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2004)).  For example, some plans may 
reimburse primary care providers via capitation while others may reimburse via fee-for-service 
(FFS).  Research attempting to make blanket statements about the impact of ACOs or MCOs in 
improving quality and reducing costs seem to sweep this heterogeneity under the rug.  This 
                                                            
1 For a summary of state Medicaid expansion plans, see: http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-around-
expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/  
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challenge, along with the concern about the non-random selection of participants, suggests that 
there is little convincing evidence on the impact of such plans on the utilization of health care 
services, health care costs, and health outcomes. 
 The purpose of our paper is to directly examine how reimbursement incentives and other 
key programmatic features among Medicaid accountable / managed care plans impact health care 
utilization and spending using a quasi-experimental approach that exploits the timing and 
county-specific implementation of Medicaid managed care mandates in Kentucky in the late 
1990s.
2
  The Medicaid program in Kentucky was changed from a FFS system to a managed care 
plan in two geographically distinct sub-sets of counties. We can compare recipients initially in 
each of the two sets of “treatment” counties before and after this reform with recipients initially 
in neighboring “control” counties that remained in a FFS system, in order to deal with any 
concerns about non-random selection into the plans.   
Despite serving Medicaid recipients in the same state, and operating less than 100 miles 
apart, the two plans selected very different reimbursement mechanisms for physicians and 
diverged along other plan dimensions as well.  These differences motivate our heterogeneous 
treatment effect approach of modeling the impact of each plan separately.  The Louisville-
centered plan (Passport) elected to reimburse physicians using a capitated payment scheme, 
while the Lexington-centered plan (Kentucky Health Select or KHS) opted for a modified FFS 
reimbursement scheme for physicians featuring a group withhold.  Another important difference 
is that the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan contracted out administrative responsibilities, 
such as utilization review, to an experienced MCO while the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan 
decided to handle such responsibilities internally.  These fundamental organizational differences 
                                                            
2 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2012), over sixty five percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries were 
enrolled in some form of a managed care plan by 2010. 
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between the two plans could have an impact upon their ability to improve quality, while at the 
same time reducing utilization and spending. 
We find that both organizations / plans decreased the probability of any monthly 
outpatient utilization among the children in our sample, though the Louisville-centered 
“capitated” plan was able to do so to a greater degree (a 61 percent reduction versus a 17 percent 
reduction).  In addition, both plans appear to have had a minimal impact on the probability of 
any monthly inpatient utilization for children, which may be explained by low baseline inpatient 
utilization rates.  Our most striking finding is that the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan 
reduced the monthly probability of any professional (physician) utilization by 44 percent among 
children, while in the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan professional (physician) utilization 
actually increased by 6 percent.  If we instead measure utilization along the intensive margin 
(using the number of monthly visits or monthly expenditures), we still find that the Louisville-
centered “capitated” plan led to significant reductions in professional and outpatient utilization 
not matched by the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan.   
Both plans increased the probability of having any monthly well child visits, though the 
Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did so to a greater degree.  Therefore, the heterogeneous 
treatments generated by differences in plan design between the two regions led to different 
outcomes with respect to utilization.  Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the reductions in 
utilization observed in the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did not lead to adverse health 
outcomes for asthmatic children, as measured by inpatient hospitalizations.  These results are 
robust to a variety of specification checks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II provides a description of the 
policy change in Kentucky Medicaid. Section III reviews the relevant literature on physician 
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reimbursement and Medicaid managed care and describes how our approach contributes to this 
literature.  Our methodological approach and identification strategy is described in section IV 
and our data in section V.  Sections VI and VII present our results and specification checks. 
Section VIII concludes with a discussion of policy implications. 
II. The Introduction of Managed Care in Kentucky Medicaid 
Brief History 
In October 1995, the Commonwealth of Kentucky received Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) approval to initiate a major restructuring of the Kentucky Medicaid program by 
dividing the state into eight regional managed care networks.  Within each region public and 
private providers were expected to collaborate to form managed care partnerships to oversee the 
provision of Medicaid services, rather than contracting these services out to commercial 
managed care providers.  The goals of this restructuring were to improve access and quality of 
care, stabilize cost growth, and emphasize primary care and prevention. 
In November 1997, Medicaid managed care enrollment began in the two regions that 
contain the state’s two major urban areas, region 3 (anchored by Louisville) and region 5 
(anchored by Lexington).
3
  These, along with the other regions, are labeled in Figure 1.  The 
managed care organization / plan covering region 3 was named the Passport Health Plan 
(Passport) and the managed care organization / plan covering region 5 was named the Kentucky 
Health Select Plan (KHS).  Ultimately, the other six regions were not able to successfully create 
managed care partnerships.  Passport, designed around the University of Louisville network, was 
                                                            
3 Currie and Fahr (2005) cite reports from the Health Care Financing Administration that classify the Medicaid 
managed care penetration rate in Kentucky as over 50 percent in 1992, 1993, and 1994. This is likely due to 
Kentucky Medicaid’s primary care case management program (KENPAC) where recipients are assigned a specific 
primary care provider. Although a primary care “gatekeeper” physician is one part of most managed care programs, 
we do not consider this feature alone to be enough to characterize a plan as being managed care.  
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charged with providing Medicaid managed care coverage to all Medicaid recipients in Jefferson 
County (containing Louisville) and 15 surrounding counties.  Similarly, the KHS plan was 
designed around the University of Kentucky network and was charged with providing Medicaid 
managed care to all Medicaid recipients in Fayette County (containing Lexington) and 20 
surrounding counties.
4
 
Both organizations also agreed to continue reporting encounter data to the state as they 
had under Medicaid FFS reimbursement rules.  Because the organizations were made up of local 
providers that were already accustomed to reporting claims to the state for billing purposes, this 
did not represent a change in reporting practice.
5
  The region 5 partnership dissolved within two 
and a half years of its introduction.  Today Medicaid recipients in region 3 are still covered under 
the Passport managed care plan, while Medicaid recipients in the rest of the state (including 
recipients in region 5) were covered under Fee-For-Service (FFS) Medicaid until late 2011.
6
   
Table 1 provides trends in overall and managed care eligibility over time.  The table 
suggests that these two regions account for almost half of the state's total population and roughly 
35 percent of the state's Medicaid population.  Table 1 also suggests that Medicaid is an 
important potential source of insurance coverage in Kentucky.  
State Capitation Payments to Passport and KHS 
Both Passport and KHS were given the responsibility of providing comprehensive health 
care coverage for their Medicaid enrollees in exchange for capitation payments (flat monthly 
                                                            
4 There are some Medicaid recipients in these counties that are excluded from managed care. They include those in 
nursing facilities or psychiatric facilities for an extended stay, those served under home and community-based 
waivers, and those who must spend down to meet eligibility income criteria. 
5 This model of having a single community-organized health system (COHS) manage care in a given region without 
accepting commercial bids was one of several models used in California to implement Medicaid managed care.   
6 The discussion of the history and institutional structure of the Passport and KHS health plans presented here draws 
in large part from Bartosch and Haber (2004), a report completed by RTI International for the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services.  To learn more about the most recent reforms to the Kentucky Medicaid program see: 
http://medicaidmc.ky.gov/Pages/index.aspx 
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fees per recipient based on their category of eligibility) negotiated with the state.  The monthly 
capitation rates for most of the timeframe we analyze in this paper are presented in Table 2A. 
Appendix Table 1 presents a list of the services covered under these capitation payments and 
those excluded for both plans.  The excluded services were to be covered by the state directly 
through FFS reimbursement or capitated through a separate waiver. 
Plan Reimbursement for Providers 
 Passport elected to reimburse primary care providers (PCPs) on a capitated basis, with the 
capitation rate adjusted for the age, gender, and eligibility mix of their patients.
7
  In addition, 
PCPs were eligible for performance-based bonuses based on such activities as extending office 
hours, maintaining an appointment reminder system, accepting new patients, and meeting goals 
for utilization of emergency room visits, inpatient days, and specialty referral costs.  In order for 
Passport to better measure resource use, an encounter claims bonus of roughly $1 for every non-
FFS claim submitted was also established for PCPs.  Hospital reimbursement was set up on a per 
diem basis using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 10 percent withhold.
8
 
 KHS instead elected to reimburse physicians and hospitals on a FFS basis using the 
Medicaid fee schedule with a 20 percent withhold.  This means that physicians would receive 80 
percent of the fee associated with each service performed and the remaining 20 percent was held 
back until the end of the year to be used as a potential reward for meeting budget targets.  PCPs 
were organized into “pools of doctors” or PODs with each POD assigned a budget by KHS.  If 
actual health care expenditures attributed to the POD exceeded the budget, then the proportion of 
                                                            
7 When we say that Passport capitates primary care providers, we mean Passport makes capitated payments to 
primary care practices.  These could include different numbers of individual primary care providers whose 
individual compensation from the practice is not observed.  
8 The current Medicaid fee schedule for Kentucky is available at the following URL: http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/fee.htm 
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the 20 percent withhold returned to the POD at the end of the year would be reduced.  If the POD 
came in under budget, then the entire withhold would be returned as well as the surplus. 
Summary of the Key Differences between the Plans 
 As summarized in Table 2B, a key difference between the two organizations was the way 
in which physicians were reimbursed.  Passport used capitation, while KHS opted for FFS with a 
20 percent withhold.  Under the Passport plan, the marginal revenue generated for a PCP from an 
additional office visit is essentially zero.  On the other hand, PCPs still received additional 
revenue from additional visits under the KHS plan.  Although the withhold may have encouraged 
some utilization reduction, it is important to note that this bonus was not measured at the level of 
the individual provider.  Therefore, each individual physician may have had an incentive to “free 
ride” off of the utilization reductions generated by other members of their POD, while keeping 
their own schedule full.    
 Another key difference between the two organizations was the way in which they 
performed basic administrative functions, such as claims processing, member/provider services, 
case management, and information sharing.  Passport opted to outsource these responsibilities to 
an administrative service organization (ASO), AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan, based in 
Philadelphia.  KHS decided to handle these responsibilities internally, despite a lack of 
experience at managing a managed care network.  To the extent that MCOs / ACOs reduce 
utilization / spending through increased coordination of care and careful review of physician 
practice patterns, experience in these basic administrative functions may be crucial.  Passport's 
choice to outsource these functions to an experienced ASO may have contributed to its relative 
success at reducing utilization among its enrollees. 
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 These initial choices described above made by the Passport organization (capitating 
reimbursement for PCPs and outsourcing important administrative functions to an experienced 
ASO) created a plan that was in many ways much closer to a “textbook” HMO / MCO / ACO 
than the KHS plan.  Thus, we would anticipate Passport to be more successful at reducing 
utilization than KHS.  
III. Literature Review 
Through our description of Kentucky’s Medicaid reform outlined in previous section, we 
view our study as contributing to two distinct strands of literature in health economics.
9
  First, 
although many academic studies on different forms of managed care (such as ACOs, MCOs, 
HMOs, PCCMs and IPOs) have emphasized the incentives of capitation payments, the 
reimbursement to physicians within the organization can vary, even though the organization as a 
whole is paid on a capitated basis.
10
  In particular, the KHS combination of FFS physician 
reimbursement and a group “withhold” for meeting budget targets has rarely been examined, and 
only in the context of a private managed care plan.  Second, there is a somewhat larger “case 
study” literature that has examined the effects of a given state’s changes in its Medicaid program 
on utilization, cost, and health outcomes. 
With respect to physician reimbursement within an organization, Cooper and Rebitzer 
(2002) note that “most of the empirical literature on physician incentives and managed care 
organizations treats physician incentive systems as a black box whose internal operation is 
                                                            
9 Note that there is a lengthy literature that examines the effects of private managed care plans as well as Medicaid 
managed care.  See, for example, Luft (1981), Miller and Luft (1994, 1997), Glied (2000), Cutler and Zeckhauser 
(2000), and Cutler et al. (2000) for discussions of managed care, and Sparer (2012) for a recent summary on 
Medicaid managed care studies.  For a discussion of Medicare managed care, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) 
Fact Sheet “Medicare Advantage” and for more discussion of Medicaid managed care, see Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2012) Policy Brief “Medicaid and Managed Care: Key Data, Trends, and Issues.” 
10 See, for example, Burns and Pauley (2012) for recent discussion of ACOs. 
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obscured from view.” (p. 12).  One exception is Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (GRT, 2004), who 
study how PCPs in managed care networks respond to incentives to contain medical 
expenditures.
11
  The HMO in that study divided physicians into panels of doctors (or PODS).
12
  
Part of the reimbursement for the group was withheld, and then the entire group was given 
financial rewards if they collectively contained costs.  GRT found that there was significant free-
riding when the size of the POD became too large.  For example, PODs with three physicians 
were much more effective at coming in under the cap than PODs with six or more physicians.  
Our study sheds further light on the ineffectiveness of extremely large PODs, since the 
Lexington region had a similar withholding policy for physicians, and the POD size averaged 20 
primary care physicians.
13
 
Although there is a large literature on Medicaid managed care (see the recent summary 
contained in Duggan and Hayford (2013)), the most convincing studies in this area have either 
focused on the “case study” of California, which created a quasi-experiment set up by phasing in 
Medicaid managed care in different counties, or at the national level through different state-by-
state implementations.
14
  The published studies that take advantage of California’s county-level 
Medicaid managed care mandates are most similar to our approach.  Duggan (2004) examines 
the impact of managed care on Medicaid spending and birth outcomes.  Aizer, Currie, and 
Moretti (2007) also examine the impact of managed care on birth outcomes.
15
  These studies 
emphasize the impact of the capitated payment that the state government offers to the managed 
                                                            
11 See Chalkley and Tilley (2006) and Dusheiko, Gravelle, Jacobs and Smith (2006) for examples from the UK. 
12 There is also a theoretical literature that explores the consequences of organizational fragmentation in the health 
care system, which emphasizes that physicians are central to resource allocation and care processes within a 
hospital, but are largely independent of hospital management.  See Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor and Votruba (2008).  
13 Bartosch and Haber (2004), p. 23. 
14 Examples at the national level include Duggan and Hayford (2013), Herring and Adams (2011), Currie and Fahr 
(2005), and Kaestner, Dubay and Kenney (2005). 
15 Barham, Gertler and Raube (2013) also examine birth and pregnancy outcomes in California and find that 
outcomes improve for the moderately disadvantaged but not the extremely disadvantaged. 
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care organization per patient, but do not discuss in detail the reimbursement of physicians.
16
  To 
date, no study has systematically examined how physician reimbursement within managed care 
organizations has affected utilization in Medicaid.  Unlike California, where there were a 
multitude of organizations who may have different reimbursement arrangements with their 
physicians, in Kentucky, Passport and KHS each had clear, and uniquely different 
reimbursement regimes for physicians.  
There are several other differences between the Kentucky reform and the California 
reform that we exploit to our advantage.  First, unlike in Kentucky, the California Medicaid 
managed care data used in the literature has no information on utilization for Medicaid managed 
care recipients.  Duggan (2004) focuses on Medicaid capitation payments rather than utilization 
in his individual level analysis and looks at birth outcomes at the county level using hospital 
discharge data rather than Medicaid claims data.  Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007) focus on 
birth outcomes, rather than overall utilization, using the California Birth Statistical Master File 
and Birth Cohort files.  A second issue with the California Medicaid data is that the mandates for 
managed care were not binding for much larger groups of recipients and services than in 
Kentucky.  For example, in some California counties undocumented workers, SSI recipients, and 
foster children were not required to participate in Medicaid managed care.  In Kentucky, 
Medicaid managed care is mandatory for SSI recipients and foster children if they live in any of 
the managed care counties.  Both California papers attempt to deal with this issue in their 
                                                            
16 Duggan (2004) notes that in California “fee-for-service reimbursement rates for many providers, including 
physicians and pharmacies, were set at the state, and not at the provider level” (p. 2563).  The only discussion of 
physician reimbursement within a managed care organization is anecdotal; Duggan notes that in one managed care 
organization – Cal Optima in Orange County – the physicians received “140% of the Medicaid fee schedule.” (p. 
2566). 
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analysis of birth outcomes by focusing on those in their data for whom the managed care 
mandate is most likely to be binding. 
Song et al. (2012) also provide more recent “case study” evidence from Massachusetts by 
examining provider organizations that entered into an alternative contracting arrangement with 
Blue Cross Blue Shield in 2009-2010.  This contracting arrangement consists of a global budget 
with pay-for-performance and places the participating provider organizations at risk for 
excessive spending.  They found that rates of spending increases slowed in these provider 
organizations as compared to control practices, with a bigger difference in the second year after 
implementation than the first.   
IV. Methods and Identification Strategy 
Identifying the Impact of Medicaid Managed Care 
 It is well recognized by health economists that selection bias represents a key barrier to 
assessing the impact of managed / accountable care on utilization.  In many settings, especially 
in the private market, consumers have the choice between some form of a managed care plan and 
a FFS plan. Since the managed care plan represents the cheaper, but less generous option, it will 
tend to be more attractive to healthier individuals.
17
  We refer to this as “enrollee selection.”  
Thus the lower costs per managed care enrollee may reflect more stringent financial incentives 
on providers and alternative delivery methods, a healthier pool of participants (enrollee 
selection), or both.  To identify the “pure” managed care effect one needs to keep the health 
composition within each type of plan constant, and, in general, OLS estimates will fail to do so 
and thus overstate the pure managed care effect. 
                                                            
17 Cutler and Reber (1998) show that younger and healthier individuals at Harvard switched to less generous health 
plans after cost-sharing arrangements were changed, leading to an “adverse selection death spiral.” 
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In the context of public health insurance, especially Medicaid, the selection issues are 
perhaps somewhat different.  The Medicaid population is poor and typically faces no 
copayments, premiums, or deductibles.  In some contexts – such as the California Medicaid 
managed care setting that Duggan (2004) and Aizer, Currie and Moretti (2007) studied – 
recipients were initially able to voluntarily choose Medicaid managed care or stay in FFS, and 
then some California counties later mandated managed care enrollment.  At least in the voluntary 
setting, it is not clear that the financial incentives to be in a managed care plan are very strong 
because Medicaid FFS plans tend to have little patient cost-sharing.  Thus, it is not clear whether 
the selection bias will be the same as in the private setting. 
In the Kentucky context, the switch from FFS to managed care was mandatory for a large 
portion of the Medicaid population, occurred at essentially one point in time, and was 
implemented in some, but not all Kentucky counties.  In other words, a Medicaid recipient could 
not simply choose to opt into a managed care program, instead enrollment was based purely on 
county of residence.  Therefore, enrollees in certain counties were automatically enrolled in 
managed care, while those in neighboring counties outside the managed care boundaries were 
not.  This description of managed care implementation in Kentucky suggests a “difference-in-
differences” approach to identify the impact of managed care on health care utilization that is 
free from the “enrollee selection” problem that plagues much of the literature. 
One option for implementing this difference-in-differences approach would be to collect 
monthly enrollment and utilization data on all Medicaid enrollees in all 120 Kentucky counties 
before and after the reform.  We could run a regression with an indicator of any monthly 
utilization as the dependent variable and an indicator of managed care enrollment, which would 
equal zero for all recipients in the pre-period and equal one for those living in one of the 37 
14 
 
managed care counties in the post period, as the independent variable.  Thus we would be 
comparing the monthly utilization of those living in the 37 managed care counties before and 
after the reform with those living in any of the other 83 counties (see Figure 1). 
While such an approach would shed light on the impact of managed care, it suffers from 
several problems.  First, it would treat managed care counties containing Kentucky's largest 
cities (Louisville in Jefferson county and Lexington in Fayette county) the same as much more 
rural managed care counties.  In addition, these cities served as the “hub” for managed care 
activities within their respective regions, so they are also different from more rural areas in that 
regard.  It may be the case that because Jefferson county contains Louisville, it is too different 
from other Kentucky counties for any comparison to be feasible. Second, it may not be 
reasonable to use counties in the far eastern or western parts of the state as controls for managed 
care counties in central Kentucky.  Table 3 provides a descriptive comparison of each of the 
eight proposed managed care regions using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census and 
confirms that there are important differences between the regions.
18
  Third, there are also 
important differences in utilization patterns in adults versus children, so an analysis of all 
enrollees would ignore these differences.  Finally, it does not address the potential endogeneity 
of residence. Enrollees may move across county lines in order to opt in or opt out of managed 
care. We refer to this as “migration endogeneity”, an issue recognized in the California Medicaid 
context by Aizer, Currie and Moretti (2007). 
Given these concerns, an alternative approach would be to focus our attention on 
enrollees in the outermost counties in both managed care regions that share a border with a FFS 
                                                            
18 Table 3 suggests that the Passport region (region 3) has a lower percentage of white inhabitants than any other 
region and is among the highest in terms of high school graduation rates.  The KHS region (region 5) has the second 
lowest percentage of white inhabitants and the lowest homeownership rate.  The poverty rate in both managed care 
regions is much lower than in regions 4, 7, and 8.  
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county.  These outermost managed care counties and their FFS neighbors are likely to make for 
much more homogenous treatment and control groups than would be the case if we used all 120 
counties.  These outermost managed care counties are also more likely to have been “followers” 
rather than “leaders” in terms of setting managed care policy for their regions.  This “border 
county” approach is motivated by, among others, the Black (1999) analysis of the effects of 
school test scores on housing prices.  By looking at geographic areas that are contiguous and 
relatively homogeneous - yet are treated very differently by the implementation of managed care 
- we feel more confident that any measured impacts do not represent other omitted county-level 
factors. 
In order to address migration endogeneity, we use managed care eligibility based on 
county of residence in January 1997 as a proxy for actual managed care enrollment.  Presumably, 
choice of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of the Medicaid 
managed care that occurred in November 1997.  We also follow the literature and focus on our 
attention on children, specifically children enrolled continuously from January 1997 to June 
1999.
19
  As a specification check, we replicate our analysis on partially enrolled children. The 
results are unchanged from what we present.  
                                                            
19 Some studies analyze individuals with Medicaid spells as short as one month, yet there are a number of challenges 
with using short Medicaid spells to measure the impact of managed care.  First, Medicaid eligibility changes are 
often associated with other changes in socioeconomic circumstances (such as changes in income, private insurance 
status, and marital status of the parent) that are difficult to observe in administrative data but may independently 
affect health care utilization.  For example, children who newly enroll in Medicaid due to a drop in parent’s income 
(and perhaps loss in private health insurance) may have utilization that is incorrectly attributed to the managed care 
or FFS arrangement rather than the drop in income.  On the other hand, children who are made eligible for Medicaid 
due to marital dissolution may be less likely to use health care due to the increased time constraints on the single 
parent.  Second, lagged insurance coverage could affect current utilization.  For example, uninsured children who 
enroll in Medicaid may initially have increased utilization due to pent-up health care demand, yet this could be 
incorrectly identified as a HMO effect.  Third, as Cutler and Gruber (1996) note, there are children who are eligible, 
but not participating in the Medicaid program who might be viewed as having conditional Medicaid coverage.  What 
this means is that when the child gets sick, it may be relatively easy to enroll the child in Medicaid.  Similar to the 
pent-up demand story, conditional coverage may incorrectly attribute utilization to managed care or FFS plans.  For 
each of these reasons, the results from an analysis of non-continuous enrollment spells are likely to be biased if there 
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While this alternative approach is promising, there is one final issue to be addressed: 
whether or not it makes sense to model the managed care “treatments” in each region as being 
homogeneous.  Our prior description of the differences in plan characteristics across the two 
regions clearly suggests that we should model the impact of managed care in each region 
separately.  Our use of separate border county FFS control groups for each region should handle 
other baseline differences between the two regions, such as differences in baseline utilization. 
To summarize our empirical strategy, we define separate treatment and control shared-
border counties for each of the two managed care regions and track the utilization of all children 
that i) live in those counties in January 1997 and ii) are continuously enrolled in Medicaid until 
June 1999. Figure 2 illustrates the 4 Passport treatment and 7 control counties as well as the 9 
KHS treatment and 14 control counties used in this analysis.
20
  Table 4 provides a descriptive 
comparison of the treatment and control counties using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census. 
The first two columns describe the Passport treatment and control counties, followed by the KHS 
treatment and control counties.  We also present descriptions of Passport and KHS counties that 
share a common border.  For both Passport and KHS, the treatment and control counties are very 
similar in terms of measurable county-level characteristics. Observable differences across the 
two regions further motivate separate Passport and KHS analyses.  Finally, it is interesting to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
are differential take-up rates in managed care and FFS counties.  Although we observe long-run insurance status and 
utilization far more accurately than previous work, by restricting the sample of Kentucky children to those who were 
continuously enrolled, it is likely that the children are poorer and less mobile than other Medicaid recipients.  In 
order to evaluate this formally, we examined data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 
1997-1999.  We find that children continuously enrolled in Medicaid tend to be more disadvantaged than those with 
intermittent Medicaid enrollment.  Additionally, sources of health insurance coverage for these children when not 
formally participating in the Medicaid program varied with the length of time spent on Medicaid.  This suggests that 
our results based on continuously enrolled children may not be generalizable to the Medicaid population as a whole.  
20 The Passport treatment counties are Breckinridge, Grayson, Larue, and Marion and the control counties are 
Hancock, Ohio, Butler, Edmonson, Hart, Green, and Taylor.  The KHS treatment counties are Lincoln, Rockcastle, 
Jackson, Estill, Powell, Montgomery, Nicholas, Harrison, and Owen and the control counties are Pulaski, Laurel, 
Clay, Owsley, Lee, Wolfe, Menifee, Bath, Fleming, Robertson, Bracken, Pendleton, Grant, and Gallatin. 
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observe how similar the Passport and KHS counties are that share a common border.  Later we 
compare the impact of the different managed care “treatments” in each these two similar sets of 
counties. 
Empirical Model Specification 
The key issue which motivates the instrumental variables approach we adopt in this paper 
is that mobility across Kentucky’s 120 counties is non-trivial, and could be correlated with the 
implementation of Medicaid managed care.  Put differently, location could be endogenous to 
health care utilization and Medicaid generosity.  In the broader literature on welfare benefits, 
Gelbach (2004) convincingly finds that among women likely to use welfare, movers move to 
higher-benefit states, and do so earlier in the life cycle.  If one believes that state-to-state moves 
occur due to differences in cash welfare generosity, then county-to-county moves (which are 
clearly less costly for families) due to differences in Medicaid generosity may be an important 
issue to account for. 
To do so, we argue that county of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the 
implementation of the Medicaid managed care that occurred in November 1997.  This follows 
the approach of Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007) who control for the endogeneity of location by 
assigning Medicaid managed care status based on the first county in which a recipient is 
observed.  Thus, we predict managed care enrollment separately in each region based on the 
interaction of two variables: time period (pre- or post-implementation) and whether the initial 
county of residence becomes a managed care county.  In other words, in each region we are 
using managed care eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as an instrument for 
actual managed care enrollment.  This exogenous eligibility measure should not affect health 
care utilization except through its effect on actual managed care enrollment. 
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Our first stage models for each region, estimated as linear probability models, are given 
below: 
HMOijt =β0 + β1 HMO_elig_Passport_initial_countyit + β2 Age_6-12it  
+ β3 Age_13-18it + Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(1a) 
HMOijt = β0 + β1 HMO_elig_KHS_initial_countyit + β2 Age_6-12it  
+ β3 Age_13-18it + Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(1b) 
where HMO represents actual managed care enrollment for child i in county j at time t, 
HMO_elig_Passport_initial_county represents Passport eligibility for child i based on initial 
county of residence and current time period (i.e. it equals 1 if the child initially resided in a 
Passport county and the time period is November 1997 onward), HMO_elig_KHS_initial_county 
represents KHS eligibility for child i based on initial county of residence and current time period, 
and Month_Year_Dummies is a vector containing an indicator for each of the 30 months (January 
1997 to June 1999) in our sample.
21
  We also include two indicators for different child age 
groupings, child fixed effects (αi), and εijt represents a standard error term.  The inclusion of child 
fixed effects controls for time-invariant child characteristics that are not observed in our 
administrative data. 
Our primary second stage specification, which examines three types health care 
utilization (professional, outpatient, and inpatient services), is also estimated as a separate linear 
probability model for each region: 
                                                            
21 Recall that a child must be enrolled in Kentucky Medicaid for all 30 months in order to be included in our sample. 
Therefore a child that moves from Kentucky to another state would not be included even if their Medicaid coverage 
across the two states was uninterrupted.  
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Any_Monthly_Utilizationijt = β0 + β1 HMOijt + β2 Age_6-12it + β3 Age_13-18it + 
Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(2) 
where Any_Monthly_Utilizationijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if child i in county j used one 
of our measures of health care utilization in month t (outpatient, professional, or inpatient), HMO 
represents actual HMO enrollment in our OLS specifications and predicted HMO enrollment 
from the first stage in our IV specifications, and the other variables are defined as before.
22
  We 
will modify this specification where needed to accommodate different measures of utilization, 
such as a measure of the monthly number of visits or monthly medical expenditures.  
V. Data 
In order to implement our empirical analysis, we were provided with de-identified, linked 
Medicaid claims and enrollment data by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. 
As described above, for each region our sample consists of children that i) live in the region's 
treatment or control counties in January 1997 and ii) are continuously enrolled in Medicaid until 
June 1999.
23
  During these 30 months, there were no changes in the company managing the 
Kentucky Medicaid information systems. 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was responsible for managing Medicaid information 
systems for Kentucky from 1994 to 2000 and a new vendor, Unisys, began managing these 
databases in January 2000.  We begin our analysis in January 1997 because data prior to that date 
                                                            
22 For a discussion of the use of linear probability models in two state least squares estimation see Angrist and 
Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971).  
23 Note that we are not requiring these children to live continuously in one of the treatment or control counties, only 
that they maintain Kentucky Medicaid enrollment.  Therefore, a child may live in a Passport treatment county in 
January 1997 then move to any other part of the state for the remaining 29 months in our analysis and stay in the 
sample, as long as they maintain their public coverage.  
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from EDS were not available.
24
  During transitions to new vendors with new database models, 
the medical claims information goes through a testing and verification period for about one year.  
We are not confident in the comparability of the new Unisys database with the previous system 
during this intermediate period, which is why we end our analysis in June 1999 (several months 
before the transition).  The benefits of using this timeframe include the fact that it spans the 
reform we are investigating and we are assured the changes in utilization we observe are not 
being driven by vendor changes.  The cost is that we cannot observe longer-run utilization 
changes.   
After dropping a few children with age discrepancies, we are left with 4,706 children in 
our Passport sample (1,890 initially in one of the 4 Passport treatment counties we are interested 
in and 2,816 initially in one of the 7 control counties) and 13,590 children in our KHS sample 
(4,273 initially living in one of the 9 KHS treatment counties we are interested in and 9,317 
initially living in one of the 14 control counties).  Descriptive statistics from our final samples 
for each region (split into treatment and control sample sub-categories) are shown in Table 5. 
Comparing the 1,890 children initially in a Passport county with the 2,816 initially in a bordering 
FFS county, we see that there was a slightly lower probability of moving across county lines 
among the Passport children (24 percent versus 26 percent).  On the other hand, there are more 
movers among the children initially in a KHS county than their FFS controls.  The amount of 
moving that we observe in both regions reinforces the motivation for our IV approach to control 
for migration endogeneity.
25
  Table 5 reinforces the finding from Table 4 that we are comparing 
                                                            
24 A longer time series of pre-reform data would have been preferable, but given that we have micro-level data 
measured at the monthly level, ten months of pre-reform utilization data allows us to sufficiently investigate the 
"common trends" assumption that is important in any difference-in-differences analysis.  
25 These high mobility rates can be corroborated with other data sets. Using the 43,111 unique Kentucky respondents 
in the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS), we find that nearly 16 percent of the sample moved in the last 
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extremely homogenous sets of counties within each region.  The children in our final Passport 
and KHS samples appear extremely similar to their FFS controls in terms of demographics and 
pre-reform utilization. 
Our health care utilization data – which is recorded regardless of whether the payment 
arrangement is FFS or managed care – is at the monthly level.  Inpatient services are defined to 
be services delivered in a hospital with an overnight stay, while outpatient services are services 
delivered in clinics or hospitals in which there is no overnight stay (such as an ER visit). 
Professional services typically represent physician services, but could also include services 
provided at locations other than physician offices, such as dental clinics and public health clinics. 
The bottom of Table 5 presents the monthly utilization rates for each type of service in the pre-
period (January 1997-October 1997) and the post-period (November 1997-June 1999) for 
children in each set of counties of interest.  These simple summary statistics in many ways tell 
the entire story.  We see large reductions in outpatient and professional utilization for children 
initially living in the Passport counties that is not matched by children initially living in the non-
Passport border counties.  Children initially living in the KHS counties, while experiencing some 
reduction in outpatient utilization, actually have a slight increase in professional utilization.  
They tend to look much more similar to children initially in the non-KHS border counties (i.e., 
children continuing to receive FFS Medicaid). 
VI. Results 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
year, with approximately 80 percent being within-state moves. Almost half of the within-state moves were from one 
of Kentucky’s 30 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA) to another. In the ACS, migration rates were higher among 
children (17 percent moved), and especially high among poor children (26 percent moved). 
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 In this section we report our empirical results and in the next section we discuss a series 
of specification checks.  We then synthesize the results and discuss how they contribute to the 
previous literature. 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Descriptive Evidence 
The heterogeneous impact of the two different managed care “treatments” is made 
especially clear in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 compares for each of the three types of services 
differences in the monthly utilization rate for the 1,890 children initially living in a Passport 
county (labeled “treatment”) to the utilization rate for the 2,816 children initially living in a non-
Passport border county (labeled “control”).  We see similar utilization rates in the pre-period for 
each type of service in both the treatment and control groups (visual support for the "common 
trends" assumption) and then striking reductions in outpatient and professional utilization for the 
Passport treatments relative to their controls.  There seems to be less of a managed care impact 
on inpatient utilization, but the extremely low baseline utilization rate makes the possibility of a 
significant reduction less likely, as does the fact that inpatient stays were still reimbursed on a 
FFS schedule with a withhold, rather than with a capitated payment. 
Figure 4 provides the same comparison for our KHS treatment and control samples. 
These graphs clearly tell a different story.  We again see similar utilization rates between the 
treatment and control counties in the pre-period.  The KHS pre-period utilization rates also 
appear to be very similar to the Passport pre-period utilization rates, with slightly lower 
outpatient and professional rates and a slightly higher inpatient rate.  In the post-period, we see 
very little difference between the KHS treatment utilization rates and the controls.  Therefore, 
these graphs suggest a very strong impact of the managed care treatment associated with the 
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Passport program and almost no impact of the managed care treatment associated with the KHS 
program.   
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Extensive Margin Regressions 
The top panel of Table 6 presents the results of a series of regressions based on equation 
(2) for the Passport region where the dependent variable in each model is a (0, 1) indicator of any 
monthly utilization of professional, outpatient, or inpatient Medicaid services.  The key 
independent variable of interest is managed care enrollment (HMO). In order to isolate the effect 
of the Passport managed care program on utilization, each model includes a series of month year 
dummies and child fixed effects.  The OLS estimate presented in column 1a suggests that the 
introduction of the Passport program led to a statistically significant 16 percentage point decline 
in the probability of any Medicaid professional utilization for the children in our sample.  This is 
relative to a monthly professional utilization rate of 36% in the pre-reform period, thus 
representing a 44% reduction in the overall monthly probability of any Medicaid professional 
utilization.  The other OLS estimates suggest a statistically significant 5.5 percentage point 
decline (61% reduction) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization and a more 
modest 0.1 percentage point decline (20% reduction) decline in the monthly probability of any 
inpatient utilization. 
Table 6 also presents results of a similar specification estimated using our Kentucky 
Health Select (KHS) sample. The OLS estimate presented in column 1c suggests that the 
introduction of the KHS program actually led to a statistically significant 2 percentage point 
increase (6% increase relative to baseline) in the probability of any Medicaid professional 
utilization. The other OLS estimates suggest a statistically significant 2 percentage point decline 
(17% relative to the pre-reform baseline) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization 
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and a 0.1 percentage point increase (14% increase) in the monthly probability of any inpatient 
utilization.
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Identification in the OLS models is achieved through the assumption that this Medicaid 
reform in Kentucky is an exogenous change to insurance type, not driven in a given county by 
some sort of related changes in Medicaid spending / utilization (policy endogeneity) or because 
of changes in the characteristics of recipients (migration endogeneity).
27
  In our IV models we 
address migration endogeneity by instrumenting actual managed care enrollment with Passport 
or KHS eligibility based on initial county of residence.
28
  Because we first observe each child in 
our sample in January 1997, our identifying assumption is that their county of residence in 
January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of managed care in November 1997.
29
  The 
results reported in Table 6 illustrate that using an IV approach leaves the coefficient estimates 
largely unchanged.  This suggests migration endogeneity is not a major source of bias to our 
                                                            
26 Although outpatient and inpatient services were not capitated under the Passport plan, one would expect that both 
the capitation of primary care providers and their role as gatekeepers, as well as other aspects of managed care, such 
as utilization review, would have an effect on these services.  As discussed in Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins 
(2013), the literature on managed care spillover suggests that such effects are important to consider. 
27 As is argued in Duggan (2004) in the case of California, one could argue in Kentucky that since the planning for 
the introduction of managed care preceded the actual implementation by multiple years, policy endogeneity is 
unlikely to be a major issue. Moreover, the cost dynamics in these border counties are likely to have been far less 
important in policy decisions than the urban centers of the managed care regions. 
28 Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007) take a similar approach to control for the endogeneity of location by assigning 
managed care status to each woman in their sample based on the first county in which she is observed. 
29 Appendix Table 2 presents the results of the first stage regressions in which Passport or KHS eligibility based on 
initial county of residence is used to predict actual managed care enrollment (HMO). The instrument is clearly a 
very strong predictor of actual managed care enrollment with a marginal managed care participation rate of 69 
percent for Passport and 79 percent for KHS. The estimated marginal take-up rate is not 100 percent in either case 
because of difficulty in measuring managed care enrollment in the first 4 months of the reform and some children 
moving across county lines, potentially into the adjacent managed care area. 
 
If none of the children in the sample left their county of residence in January 1997, then the indicator of actual 
managed care enrollment in the administrative dataset should be perfectly correlated with our eligibility indicator 
based on initial county of residence (because managed care enrollment is based on county of residence). Table 5 
indicates that children do move across counties within the state, so we did not expect a coefficient of 1 in the first 
stage. In addition, during the first four months associated with the introduction of the Passport and KHS, the 
administrative indicator for actual managed care enrollment does not always match up with the child’s county of 
residence. For example, we observe a small number of cases where a child’s county of residence is a Passport 
county, but the indicator of managed care enrollment is equal to zero (or the opposite situation) during these first 
four months. 
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OLS estimates of the impact of Passport and KHS on health care utilization.  Although we do 
observe children moving, those moves do not appear to be motivated by differences in Medicaid 
provision across counties. 
 Our primary results suggest that both Passport and KHS decreased outpatient utilization 
among the children in our sample along the extensive margin, though Passport was able to do so 
to a greater degree (61% reduction versus 17% reduction).  In addition, both programs appear to 
have had a minimal impact on inpatient care utilization for children along the extensive margin, 
which is probably not surprising given the low overall utilization of inpatient services for 
children.  A key difference between the effects of the two programs is that Passport reduced 
professional utilization by 44% along the extensive margin, while KHS actually increased 
professional utilization by 6%.  We now consider changes along the intensive margin and 
changes in health care spending.  Given that migration endogeneity and policy endogenity do not 
appear to bias our results, we do not instrument for HMO status in our subsequent analysis.
30
 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Intensive Margin Regressions 
 In order to analyze changes along the intensive margin, we modify equation (2) by 
replacing the dependent variable with a count for the number of monthly professional, outpatient, 
or inpatient visits.  Since each of these dependent variables includes a large number of zeros, we 
estimate these regressions as Poisson models.  The results of the Poisson models for both 
Passport and KHS are given in Table 7, where the marginal effects associated with HMO 
enrollment are presented for each outcome of interest. 
 Similar to the impact along the extensive margin, the introduction of the Passport 
program led to reductions in the number of monthly professional, outpatient, and inpatient visits 
                                                            
30 This finding with respect to migration endogeneity mirrors the results of a study (Schwartz and Sommers (2014)) 
that investigates changes in state-to-state migration after recent public insurance expansions. 
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along the intensive margin, with all three reductions being statistically significant in this case.  
We see no statistically significant change in the number of outpatient or inpatient visits 
associated with the KHS plan, but a statistically significant increase in the number of monthly 
professional visits.  Thus, the KHS plan was associated with increases in professional visits 
along both the intensive and extensive margin, while the Passport plan was associated with 
reductions in professional visits along both margins.       
Effect of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Spending 
Next we turn our attention to the effects of HMO enrollment on monthly health care 
spending.  The results reported in Table 6 can be viewed as changes in health care spending 
along the extensive margin.  In other words, those results tell us whether or not managed care 
had an impact on the likelihood that an enrollee had any monthly health care expenditure.  The 
estimates presented in Table 8 focus on the intensive margin; those months in which a patient 
had positive expenditures.  These results come from a modified version of equation (2) where the 
dependent variable is the log of monthly spending on professional, outpatient, or inpatient care, 
conditional on having non-zero monthly spending.  We estimate each equation using OLS.  
Table 8 suggests that both programs led to statistically significant reductions in monthly health 
care spending, conditional on non-zero monthly spending.  The magnitude of the effect is larger 
for Passport than KHS. 
We also take an alternate approach to model monthly health care spending that allows us 
to determine where on the distribution of medical spending any observed reductions in utilization 
are coming from.  For example, is the 61% reduction in the monthly probability of consuming 
any outpatient services observed in the Passport region achieved by reducing utilization among 
“heavy” users of outpatient services?  The regressions reported in Table 9 address this question 
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for outpatient and professional services in both the Passport and KHS regions.  We create new 
dependent variables equal to 1 in months where the child’s professional or outpatient Medicaid 
spending exceed the 50
th
 percentile of the respective monthly spending distribution (conditional 
on having positive spending).  In the first column, the dependent variable equals 1 in a given 
month if a child has professional service spending / claims above $50 (approximately the 50
th
 
percentile of professional spending), and in second column the dependent variable equals 1 if in 
a given month a child has outpatient spending /claims above $100 (approximately the 50
th
 
percentile of outpatient spending).   
Table 9 reports that Passport led to a 92% reduction in the probability of having monthly 
outpatient spending above $100.  This suggests a far stronger impact of Passport on outpatient 
utilization for those with relatively high outpatient spending / claims.  For professional services 
we see that Passport focuses on the left tail of the distribution.  Passport leads to a 32% reduction 
in the probability of having any monthly professional spending above $50, as compared to a 44% 
reduction in the probability of having any monthly professional spending (Table 6).  For KHS, 
more of the action for both outpatient and professional spending is coming from high spenders, 
though the interpretation differs because the signs differ.  The reduction in the overall probability 
of any monthly outpatient spending for KHS is driven more strongly by reductions among the 
high spenders, while the increase in the overall probability of any monthly professional spending 
is being driven more strongly by increases among the high spenders.     
Effect of HMO Enrollment on Well Child Utilization – Extensive and Intensive Margins 
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 While our previous results examine broad categories of utilization, one specific type of 
service is of particular interest, well child office visits.
31
  If managed or accountable care 
organizations want to reduce utilization through improvements in preventive care, then we would 
expect them to promote such office visits.  There may be some concern, however, that the 
incentives created by the Passport capitation of primary care providers may reduce such visits. 
 Table 10 examines the impact of the introduction of Passport and KHS on monthly well 
child utilization along both the extensive and intensive margins.  Both plans increased both the 
probability of having a monthly well child visit (extensive margin) as well as the number of well 
child visits received (intensive margin).  The magnitudes of the increases are larger for Passport 
than for KHS.  In particular, the introduction of Passport led to a 31% increase in the probability 
of having a well child visit in a particular month, while the introduction of the KHS plan led to a 
9% increase.   
Effect of HMO Enrollment on Health Outcomes 
Our Passport results provide compelling evidence that utilization can be reduced through 
the high-powered incentives provided in typical managed care arrangements.  One common 
criticism, however, is that this reduction in utilization comes at a real cost: patients do not 
receive some of the appropriate or necessary care they were getting under FFS.  Above we 
examined a particular type of service associated with such concerns (well child visits).  Now we 
examine a particular type of enrollee, children with asthma.  If the utilization reductions in 
Passport we observe imply poorer primary care for this vulnerable population, we would expect 
                                                            
31 We define well child visits as visits identified with CPT codes 99382, 99393, 99392, 99393 and IDC-9 codes 
V20.2, V70.0, V70.3, V70.5, V70.6, V70.8, and V70.9, as suggested by the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance (NCQA). 
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a higher hospitalization rate after Passport is implemented among this group (Aizer and Currie 
(2002) & Aizer (2007)). 
Table 11A provides regression results on utilization for various groupings of Kentucky 
counties.  The first set of columns breaks out the 4,706 children from the 4 treatment and 7 
control counties for Passport into 323 asthmatic children and 4,383 others.
32
  As in the full 
sample, we see no statistically significant change in inpatient utilization for asthmatics along the 
extensive margin.  Asthmatics also have similar changes in outpatient and professional 
utilization.  For comparative purposes, the second column reports the regression results for the 
non-asthmatic children. 
Because the asthmatic sample size is relatively small, we expanded the sample in two 
ways.  First, we expand the sample to include all 30 month enrolled children in all 16 Passport 
counties as the treatment group and all 30 month enrolled children in all 19 Region 4 counties to 
the south (see Figure 1) as the control group.  As the second set of columns show, this increases 
the number of asthmatics to 2,027, but the basic conclusions do not change.  Second, we also 
expand the sample by including all 30 month enrolled children in Regions 4 (19 counties) and 2 
(12 counties) as the control group. The third set of columns show that this increases the number 
of asthmatics to 2,447.  Again the results do not change.  Because we find that hospitalizations 
did not go up for asthmatic children, we take this as suggestive, but certainly not conclusive, 
evidence that there were not detrimental health impacts associated with Passport utilization 
reductions.  Table 11B reports the results of similar analysis for the KHS plan.  Splitting our 
initial KHS sample into asthmatics and non-asthmatics also shows no statistically significant 
                                                            
32 We define an asthmatic as a child with at least one occurrence of the ICD-9 code associated with asthma (493) in 
the 10 month pre-reform time period. 
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change in inpatient admissions for asthmatic children.  A full analysis of the health impacts of 
managed care is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be the subject of future research. 
VII. Specification Checks 
In this section we consider a variety of specification checks to test the robustness of our 
primary results.  We expand our sample by allowing for children that were partially enrolled and 
by allowing for children that live in non-border counties.  We then restrict our sample to a one 
year post-reform timeframe.  Next we formally test the common trends assumption associated 
with difference-in-differences analysis.  We then examine utilization changes for children that 
live on the Passport – KHS border and conclude by considering changes in provider participation 
in Medicaid.  
Allow for Partial Enrollment 
 Table 12 replicates our primary specifications estimated in Table 6 with an expanded 
sample that allows for children that were not enrolled in Medicaid for all 30 months in our data.  
This increases the number of children in the Passport analysis from 4,706 children to 8,693 
children and the KHS sample from 13,590 children to 23,825 children.  Focusing on the OLS 
results, we see that expanding the sample in this way does not change our primary results.  
Passport still led to large reductions in professional and outpatient utilization, while KHS led to a 
more modest reduction in outpatient utilization and an increase in professional utilization.  
Neither plan had a statistically significant impact on inpatient utilization.  This implies that our 
primary results are not being driven by selection into continuous Medicaid coverage over our 
timeframe. 
Allow for Non-Border Counties 
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 Next we consider how our conclusions would change if we used a larger, but more 
geographically diverse sample.  Recall that our “Passport experiment” used only four of sixteen 
counties in Region 3 for the treatment group, as well as seven contiguous counties outside of 
Region 3 for the control group.  The “KHS experiment” used nine of twenty-one counties in 
Region 5 for the treatment group, and fourteen counties outside of Region 5 for the control 
group.  In addition, given the differences in plan design, the managed care “treatment” was 
fundamentally different in the two regions. 
Table 13 shows the results of expanding the sample using the same OLS models that 
were used in Table 6 (the coefficients from that table are presented in the first two rows of Table 
13 as reference).  We begin by combining the treatment regions, estimating the effect of 
managed care without regard to the underlying differences between the two regions.  As might 
be expected, the treatment effect of managed care is essentially a weighted average of the 
treatment effects in the two managed care regions.  Overall, professional utilization falls by 4 
percentage points, far smaller than the 16 percentage point drop in the Passport region, but a 
substantially larger drop than the 2 percentage point increase observed in the KHS region.  The 
conclusions for outpatient utilization mirror those for professional utilization, while the effect on 
inpatient utilization is in all cases insignificant.   
We conclude that ignoring the underlying incentives created by different forms of 
managed / accountable care can lead to very different conclusions about the magnitude of its 
effect on utilization.  This implies that studies that ignore such heterogeneity across MCOs or 
ACOs, which is often the case in the literature, may end up with biased estimates of the impact 
of such financing and care provision arrangements. 
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Next, we expand our sample to include continuously-enrolled children in all Region 3 
and Region 5 counties as the treatment group, and all continuously-enrolled children in the other 
six regions as the control group.  It should be clear from our previous comparison of the eight 
regions (Table 3) that doing so makes the treatment and control groups far more heterogeneous. 
Relative to the approach of focusing on geographically contiguous regions, our estimated 
impacts of managed care are roughly 15 to 20 percent smaller.  We interpret this difference as 
suggesting that un-modeled, omitted factors are correlated with both the implementation of 
managed care and utilization in the larger sample; for example, it is possible that utilization 
trends in urban areas trended differently over time than utilization in rural areas, and the urban 
areas also adopted managed care. 
Restrict Sample to One Year Post-Reform Timeframe 
 Figure 3 suggests a dip in outpatient utilization one year after the implementation of the 
Passport program (November 1998) that is larger than the utilization reduction that occurs 
immediately after Passport began operating.  We investigate the sensitivity of our results to this 
dip by restricting the post-reform timeframe in the models reported in Table 6 to 12 months.  
Thus for these models the pre-reform timeframe is January 1997 through October 1997 (10 
months) and the post-reform timeframe is November 1997 through October 1998 (12 months).   
 Table 14 shows that restricting the post-reform timeframe to 12 months reduces the 
magnitude of the Passport reduction in professional utilization from 44% to 38% and the 
reduction in outpatient utilization from 61% to 29%.  In both cases the results for professional 
and outpatient services are highly statistically significant, while the estimated impact on inpatient 
utilization is not.  Restricting the post-reform timeframe in this way makes almost no change to 
the KHS results.  Therefore, restricting attention to one year post-reform does not change our 
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primary result: Passport led to large reductions in professional and outpatient services that were 
not matched by the KHS plan.    
Test for Common Trends in the Pre-Period 
 In order to formally test whether or not there were differential utilization trends between 
the treatment and control counties in each region prior to the reform, we re-estimated the models 
reported in Table 6 with a treatment indicator interacted with dummies for each of the first eight 
months of the pre-reform time period.  As shown in Table 15, in our Passport models for 
professional, outpatient, and inpatient utilization we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
pre-reform interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  In our KHS models we cannot reject this 
same null hypothesis in our outpatient and inpatient utilization models.  There does seem to be 
some evidence of differential trends in professional utilization.  Overall these results formalize 
what we can observe in Figures 3 and 4, that there do not appear to be major differential 
utilization trends in the pre-reform time period for either region. 
Comparing Treated Border Counties 
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the Passport and KHS regions also share a border, meaning that as 
an additional specification check we can compare utilization pre- and post-reform for 5 Passport 
(Washington, Nelson, Spencer, Shelby, and Henry) and 4 KHS (Boyle, Mercer, Anderson, and 
Franklin) counties that were excluded from the previous analysis.  The final two columns of 
Table 4 suggest that these counties are extremely similar, other than the managed care region 
they were assigned to.  Figure 5 presents outpatient, professional, and inpatient utilization 
comparisons.  The figure suggests similar utilization rates in both sets of counties prior to the 
reform, then stronger utilization reductions in the Passport counties relative to their KHS 
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neighbors.  These graphs therefore lend further support to the notion that the Passport plan was 
better able to reduce utilization than the KHS plan. 
Provider Participation 
 Our final specification check examines provider participation.  Are the reductions in 
Passport utilization coming from reduced access to health care (i.e., fewer providers participating 
in the program), rather than more efficient delivery of services?  A managed care network would 
likely restrict the number of doctors, but were those restrictions so severe as to cause the 
reduction we observe?  From the universe of Medicaid recipients in the treatment/control 
counties, we are able to extract unique provider identifiers.  Figure 6A illustrates that although 
the number of Medicaid providers did not grow in the Passport counties (as they did in the 
control counties), they did not shrink either.  In addition, the figure shows that the number of 
providers did not abruptly change with the implementation of managed care, even though 
utilization did.  The differences in levels seem to reflect population size differences.  Figure 6B 
shows a similar pattern for the KHS plan.  As a result, it is difficult to believe that the sharp drop 
in utilization we observe within Passport is the result of reduced access. 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
The unique introduction of managed care in the Kentucky Medicaid program allows us to 
document and analyze organizational differences between two Medicaid managed care plans that 
started at the same time, operated in close proximity to one another, and served relatively 
homogeneous sets of enrollees.  In particular, we focus on differences in physician 
reimbursement systems used by the two plans because such reimbursement systems are, 
according to Copper and Rebitzer (2002), often considered a “black box whose internal operation 
is obscured from view.”  We also consider differences in other administrative functions between 
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the two plans.  Overall, we find that Passport’s choices of using capitation to reimburse primary 
care physicians and contracting out some other basic managed care administrative 
responsibilities to be more effective in reducing utilization than KHS’s choices to use a modified 
FFS reimbursement scheme and handle all administrative responsibilities in house. 
 Whether utilization is measured along the extensive (probability of any monthly visits) or 
intensive margin (number of monthly visits or monthly expenditure), we find that the Passport 
“capitated” program led to significant reductions in professional and outpatient utilization not 
matched by the KHS “withhold” plan.  In fact, professional utilization actually increased within 
the KHS “withhold” plan.  This can likely be explained by differences in the financial incentives 
PCPs within each plan faced.  Due to capitation, the marginal revenue associated with an 
additional visit was zero for Passport physicians.  In contrast, KHS attempted to incentivize 
physicians through the use FFS reimbursement with a group withhold.  As predicted by the 
literature on optimal group size (GRT (2004)), the typical group size of 20 that was used by the 
KHS “withhold” plan was much too big to serve as an effective deterrent to free-riding.   
  Given the magnitude of the utilization reductions we observe within the Passport 
“capitated” program, we investigated a host of reasons, besides changes in physician financial 
incentives, which could explain such reductions.  First, we examined whether or not access to 
Medicaid-participating physicians fell within the Passport region.  We found that the number of 
providers serving our Passport “capitated” sample remained extremely steady during our 36 
month timeframe.  Second, we considered whether or not particular services of interest (well 
child visits) or particular populations of interest (asthmatic children) where differentially targeted 
within the Passport “capitated” plan.  We found no change in hospitalization rates for asthmatic 
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children and observed an increase in well child visit utilization, consistent with the idea that 
managed care promotes preventive services.   
A third concern would be that the utilization reductions we observe were driven by 
changes in reporting rather than actual reductions in service provision.  Unlike the California 
transition to Medicaid managed care (Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007), Duggan (2004)), 
providers in Kentucky were required to report encounter data and were given a modest financial 
incentive to do so.  From the perspective of the plans, both Passport and KHS had strong 
incentives to measure their provision of care as such information would be useful in negotiating 
future capitation rates with the state.  
One may also wonder if there are flaws in our “quasi-experimental” research design.  
Relative to other investigations of Medicaid managed care we would argue we have a number of 
advantages.  First, unlike within California, enrollment in managed care in Kentucky was 
mandatory for virtually all children in the “treatment” counties.  Second, as shown, our 
“treatment” and “control” counties are extremely balanced on observable characteristics.  Third, 
the implications of our story stand up to all robustness checks that we investigated – including 
partial Medicaid spells, expanding to a broader set of counties, testing pre-existing trends, etc. 
Thus, at the end of the day, we then are left with the most likely story: financial 
incentives for physicians – which are transparently laid out in the Kentucky context but not 
others – matters greatly for utilization.  The utilization declines found in our study stand in 
contrast with the zero or positive expenditure findings in other Medicaid managed care studies 
(Duggan (2004), Herring and Adams (2011), and Duggan and Hayford (2011)).  Although there 
are many differences between the studies, including the nature of the reforms and populations 
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being analyzed, this contrast may highlight the importance of the distinction between true 
resource utilization (Q) and negotiated reimbursement levels (P) that impact expenditures (P*Q).  
That being said, there is more work that needs to be done to better understand the impact 
of Medicaid managed care.  This paper focuses on a specific group of enrollees (children) and 
broad measures of utilization (inpatient, outpatient, and professional) within one state 
(Kentucky), which raises potential concerns regarding external validity.
33
  We can address this to 
some degree in future work by using our identification strategy to do an analysis of the impact 
managed care on adult Medicaid enrollees in Kentucky or focus on more specific types of 
services, such as prescription drugs.  In particular, we wouldn’t want to extrapolate our current 
findings with respect to the health outcomes for asthmatic children to other types of Medicaid 
recipients, such as pregnant women or those dually eligible for Medicare, or other types of 
vulnerable children, such as newborns.       
Even if we answered every possible question about Medicaid managed care in the 
Kentucky context, it is not necessarily clear how well these findings would translate to other 
states.  For example, Kentucky ranks 45
th
 out of 50 states in overall health according to the 
United Health Foundation, with above average rates of preventable hospitalizations, obesity, 
smoking, infant mortality, and children in poverty, among other measures.
34
  On the other hand, 
as is often the case with research involving state Medicaid programs, there is a trade-off between 
the number of states included in the analysis and the ability to fully understand the details of the 
reforms of interest in order to develop a strong research design that allows for causal inference.  
This suggests the need for more work on Medicaid-related topics to come from other states.  
                                                            
33 Of course, focusing on children is not that restrictive because over half of Medicaid recipients are children.  For 
more information, see: http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/By-
population.html  
34 For more information, see: http://www.americashealthrankings.org/Ranking  
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State Medicaid expansions under the ACA will no doubt be a catalyst for such work in the 
future. 
Despite these limitations, our results should be of interest to policymakers considering 
Medicaid managed care as a cost-containment measure, given the specific fiscal challenge of 
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Such financial difficulties have 
recently led to further transition towards Medicaid managed care in Kentucky. In November 
2011, Kentucky expanded Medicaid managed care to the 104 non-Passport counties.
35
  The 
expansion is projected to save the program $1.3 billion.  In addition, Florida recently approved a 
massive overhaul of its Medicaid system, which will shift hundreds of thousands of Medicaid 
recipients into HMOs.  Plan sponsor, Representative Rob Schenck (R-Spring Hill, FL), said “We 
get to save billions of dollars, and we get to deliver better health care.”36  It is anticipated that 
Medicaid managed care will be available in all areas of Florida by October 2014.
37
  Finally, 
Governor Sam Brownback announced in late 2011 a massive restructuring of Kansas Medicaid, 
called KanCare.  KanCare was implemented in January 2013, is projected to save $853.1 million 
during its first five years, and would make Kansas the only state with managed care companies 
providing care statewide to all Medicaid enrollees.
38
  Our analysis suggests that up front plan 
design decisions, such as the choice of reimbursement mechanism for physicians, may in large 
part determine the eventual success or failure of any expansions of managed care. 
                                                            
35 See http://migration.kentucky.gov/newsroom/governor/20111028managedcare.htm 
36 See http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/May/08/Florida-Legislature-Passes-Massive-Medicaid-
Overhaul.aspx  
37 See 
http://www.ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/statewide_mc/pdf/mma/Overview_of_Managed_Medical_Assistance_pro
gram_02-12-2013.pdf 
38 See http://media.khi.org/news/documents/2012/04/26/KanCareBrief_Final.pdf and 
http://www.kancare.ks.gov/whats_kancare.htm 
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 Table 1 
Trends in Kentucky Population and Medicaid Enrollment (in thousands) 
Year Statewide 
Population 
Region 3 
(Passport) 
Population 
Region 5 
(KHS) 
Population 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Region 3 
(Passport) 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Region 5 
(KHS) 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
Managed 
Care 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
FFS 
1997 3,953 1,093 719 532 112 75 0 532 
1998 3,985 1,102 730 521 109 73 181 340 
1999 4,018 1,114 742 518 106 71 177 341 
2000 4,049 1,125 810 557 114 79 114 443 
2001 4,066 1,132 801 608 126 88 126 482 
2002 4,087 1,139 790 627 131 91 131 496 
Sources: Population estimates are from the Kentucky State Data Center (http://ksdc.louisville.edu/ ) and the Medicaid eligible estimates are from the 
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm). Passport was implemented in Region 3 from 1998 onward. 
Kentucky Health Select (KHS) was implemented in Region 5 during 1998-1999. 
 
  
 Table 2A 
Passport and Kentucky Health Select Monthly Capitation Rates (in dollars) 
  Passport 
Eligibility Category Prior to 
November 1997 
November 1997 to 
June 1998 
July 1998 to 
December 1998 
AFDC/TANF N/A 137.00 146.20 
Foster Care N/A 177.38 188.52 
SOBRA N/A 171.02 181.85 
SSI with Medicare N/A 117.00 125.24 
SSI without Medicare N/A 504.65 531.51 
SCHIP N/A N/A N/A 
    
 Kentucky Health Select 
 Eligibility Category Prior to 
November 1997 
November 1997 to 
June 1998 
July 1998 to 
December 1998 
AFDC/TANF N/A 124.18 150.39 
Foster Care N/A 166.26 194.52 
SOBRA N/A 160.28 188.67 
SSI with Medicare N/A 143.03 170.16 
SSI without Medicare N/A 382.39 421.14 
SCHIP N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004).  Notes: AFDC/TANF refers to Medicaid recipients whose eligibility is tied to their eligibility for 
cash welfare, called Aid to Families with Dependent Children prior to the 1997 welfare reform and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
afterwards.  SOBRA refers to Medicaid recipients eligible as a result of the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which expanded Medicaid 
eligibility for children and pregnant women.  SSI refers to Medicaid recipients also eligible for Supplemental Security Income Program and SCHIP 
refers to the State Children's Health Insurance Program. 
 
  
  
Table 2B 
Summary of Plan Differences 
  Passport KHS 
 
Timeframe Nov 1997 – present Nov 1997 – June 2000 
 
# Counties / Anchor 16 counties / Louisville 21 counties / Lexington 
PCP  
reimbursement Capitation 
FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule 
with 20% withhold 
Hospital 
reimbursement 
FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule 
with a 10% withhold 
FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule 
with 20% withhold 
Specialist 
reimbursement 
FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule 
with a 10% withhold 
FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule 
with a 10% withhold 
Administrative 
Responsibilities 
Contracted out to AmeriHealth Mercy 
Health Plan Handled internally 
Report claims / 
encounters as in the 
pre-reform period? Yes Yes 
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
Regional Comparisons using the Census 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
(Passport) 
Region 4 Region 5 
(KHS) 
Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 
Total Population, 
2006 
235 382 1,177 472 799 400 250 491 
Average County 
Population 
20 32 74 24 38 67 18 26 
White (%) 90.5 88.0 80.7 92.5 86.9 93.0 96.0 96.9 
Living In Same 
House, 1995 
and 2000 (%) 
59.5 56.0 54.0 56.9 48.8 53.9 61.7 66.6 
High School 
Graduates 
In 2000 (%) 
75.8 74.9 80.0 66.8 77.7 81.4 68.1 58.7 
Homeownership 
In 2000 (%) 
75.0 71.2 69.9 73.9 64.9 70.3 77.0 76.1 
Poverty Rate 
In 2004 (%) 
15.6 15.8 13.7 18.9 14.7 10.6 20.0 26.3 
Kentucky 
Counties 
in Region 
Ballard, 
Caldwell, 
Calloway, 
Carlisle, 
Crittenden, 
Fulton, 
Graves, 
Hickman, 
Livingston, 
Lyon, 
Marshall, 
McCracken 
Christian, 
Daviess, 
Hancock, 
Henderson, 
Hopkins, 
McLean, 
Muhlenberg, 
Ohio, 
Todd, 
Trigg, 
Union, 
Webster 
Breckinridge, 
Bullitt, 
Carroll, 
Grayson, 
Hardin, 
Henry, 
Jefferson, 
Larue, 
Marion, 
Meade, 
Nelson, 
Oldham, 
Shelby, 
Spencer, 
Trimble, 
Washington 
Adair, 
Allen, 
Barren, 
Butler, 
Casey, 
Clinton, 
Cumberland, 
Edmonson, 
Green, 
Hart, 
Logan, 
McCreary, 
Metcalfe, 
Monroe, 
Pulaski, 
Russell, 
Simpson, 
Taylor, 
Warren, 
Wayne 
Anderson, 
Bourbon, 
Boyle, 
Clark, 
Estill, 
Fayette, 
Franklin, 
Garrard, 
Harrison, 
Jackson, 
Jessamine, 
Lincoln, 
Madison, 
Mercer, 
Montgomery, 
Nicholas, 
Owen, 
Powell, 
Rockcastle, 
Scott, 
Woodford 
Boone, 
Campbell, 
Gallatin, 
Grant, 
Kenton, 
Pendleton 
Bath, 
Boyd, 
Bracken, 
Carter, 
Elliott, 
Fleming, 
Greenup, 
Lawrence, 
Lewis, 
Mason, 
Menifee, 
Morgan, 
Robertson, 
Rowan 
Bell, 
Breathitt, 
Clay, 
Floyd, 
Harlan, 
Johnson, 
Knott, 
Knox 
Laurel, 
Lee, 
Leslie, 
Letcher, 
Magoffin, 
Martin, 
Owsley, 
Perry, 
Pike, 
Whitley, 
Wolfe 
Source: U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html  Notes: Population measured in thousands. 
 
  
 Table 4 
Final Study County Comparisons using the Census 
 Passport 
Treatment 
Passport 
Control 
KHS 
Treatment 
KHS 
Control 
Passport 
Counties 
(Shared Border) 
KHS 
Counties 
(Shared Border) 
Total Population, 
2006 
77 112 147 253 126 119 
Average County 
Population 
19 16 16 18 25 30 
White (%) 93.9 95.0 96.5 96.3 89.3 89.0 
Living In Same House, 
1995 and 2000 (%) 
60.7 62.1 58.2 59.6 54.2 53.0 
High School Graduates 
in 2000 (%) 
67.7 64.6 63.7 63.4 76.9 78.0 
Homeownership 
In 2000 (%) 
79.1 78.5 75.5 76.6 77.1 70.3 
Poverty Rate 
In 2004 (%) 
16.7 17.8 19.0 20.6 12.1 12.7 
Counties Breckinridge, 
Grayson, 
Larue, 
Marion 
Butler, 
Edmonson, 
Green, 
Hart, 
Hancock, 
Ohio, 
Taylor 
Estill, 
Harrison, 
Jackson, 
Lincoln, 
Montgomery, 
Nicholas, 
Owen, 
Powell, 
Rockcastle 
Bath, 
Bracken, 
Clay, 
Fleming, 
Gallatin, 
Grant, 
Laurel, 
Lee, 
Menifee, 
Owsley, 
Pendleton, 
Pulaski, 
Robertson, 
Wolfe 
Henry, 
Nelson, 
Shelby, 
Spencer, 
Washington 
Anderson, 
Boyle, 
Franklin, 
Mercer 
Source: U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html  Notes: Population measured in thousands. 
  
 Table 5 
Summary Statistics using Kentucky Administrative Data 
 Children Initially 
in a Passport 
County 
Children Initially in a 
Passport Control 
County 
Children initially 
in a KHS County 
Children initially 
in a KHS Control 
County 
# children 1,890 2,816 4,273 9,317 
# child months (30 months total) 56,700 84,480 128,190 279,510 
% of children that switched county 23.9   26.0 25.2*** 20.6 
Demographics:     
Age on Jan 1, 1996 7.1* 6.8 7.1   7.1 
% non-white 11.1 9.7 6.5 5.9 
% female 48.9** 45.6 46.7 47.5 
Number of siblings 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Any Utilization? (percentage with any monthly 
Medicaid utilization): 
    
Outpatient Utilization - Pre-reform 
 
9.8%*** 8.6% 10.4%*** 9.5% 
Outpatient Utilization - Post-reform 
 
5.2%*** 8.0% 8.2%*** 9.0% 
Professional Utilization - Pre-reform 
 
37.6%*** 35.1% 32.2%*** 36.1% 
Professional Utilization - Post-reform 
 
24.8%*** 34.3% 32.5%*** 35.5% 
Inpatient Utilization - Pre-reform 
 
0.5% 0.6% 0.4%*** 0.5% 
Inpatient Utilization - Post-reform 
 
0.3%*** 0.4% 0.3%*** 0.4% 
Well Child Visit Utilization - Pre-reform 
 
3.9%** 3.4% 4.5%*** 5.2% 
Well Child Visit Utilization - Post-reform 
 
3.4%*** 2.3% 2.6%*** 2.8% 
Utilization Count? (number of monthly Medicaid 
visits): 
    
Outpatient visits - Pre-reform 
 
0.126*** 0.107 0.130*** 0.123 
Outpatient visits - Post-reform 
 
0.067*** 0.100 0.120** 0.116 
Professional visits - Pre-reform 
 
0.699*** 0.604 0.560*** 0.650 
Professional visits - Post-reform 
 
0.520*** 0.642 0.604*** 0.684 
Inpatient visits - Pre-reform 
 
0.006 0.007 0.004*** 0.006 
Inpatient visits - Post-reform 
 
0.003*** 0.005 0.004*** 0.005 
Well Child visits - Pre-reform 0.042** 0.037 0.048*** 0.055 
Well Child visits - Post-reform 0.040*** 0.025 0.031 0.030 
Expenditures | Expenditures > 0? (amount of monthly 
Medicaid spending): 
    
Outpatient spending - Pre-reform 
 
$226.09 $247.93 $186.73*** $211.85 
Outpatient spending - Post-reform 
 
$160.13*** $254.89 $191.87*** $256.31 
Professional spending - Pre-reform 
 
$120.76*** $150.69 $113.01*** $123.96 
Professional spending - Post-reform 
 
$182.15* $168.96 $134.57*** $144.26 
Inpatient spending - Pre-reform 
 
$2,551.12 $2,526.10 $3,194.84 $2,750.84 
Inpatient spending - Post-reform 
 
$2,502.06 $2,403.74 $2,603.59*** $3,238.53 
 Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The 
pre-reform time period is January 1997 to October 1997 while the post-reform time period is November 1997 to June 1999.  The stars represent 
the results of tests for difference in means or proportions between the treatment and control counties within each region. Three stars, two stars, and 
one star imply statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  
  
Table 6 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization - Extensive Margin 
 Passport 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
  OLS 
(1a) 
IV 
(1b) 
OLS 
(2a) 
IV 
(2b) 
OLS 
(3a) 
IV 
(3b) 
HMO Enrollment -0.159*** 
(0.007) 
    -0.174*** 
(0.007) 
    -0.055 *** 
(0.003) 
    -0.060*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6% 
Percent Change: -44% -48% -61% -66% -20% -24% 
 KHS 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
 OLS 
(1c) 
IV 
(1d) 
OLS 
(2c) 
IV 
(2d) 
OLS 
(3c) 
IV 
(3d) 
HMO Enrollment      0.021*** 
(0.004) 
     0.012*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
    -0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.0005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5% 
Percent Change:  6% 3% -17% -21% 14% 15% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family 
Services. Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport 
regressions include 4,706 children followed for 30 months (N = 141,180), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children 
followed for 30 months (N = 407,700). Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
  
Table 7 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization - Intensive Margin 
 Passport 
 Number of 
Professional Visits 
Number of 
Outpatient Visits 
Number of 
Inpatient Visits 
   (1a)  (2a)  (3a) 
HMO Enrollment -0.398*** 
(0.033) 
    -0.650 *** 
(0.059) 
-0.210** 
(0.106) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size: 137,910 100,530 13,680 
 KHS 
 Number of 
Professional Visits 
Number of 
Outpatient Visits 
Number of 
Inpatient Visits 
  (1b)  (2b)  (3b) 
HMO Enrollment      0.059** 
(0.023) 
    0.002 
(0.025) 
 0.086 
(0.095) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size: 397,140 302,550 35,790 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and 
Family Services. Notes: These regressions are all estimated as Poisson models and include monthly controls for child 
age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter 
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Spending (Conditional on Positive Monthly Spending) 
 Passport 
 Log Spending on 
Professional Visits 
Log Spending on 
Outpatient Visits 
Log Spending on 
Inpatient Visits 
   (1a)  (2a)  (3a) 
HMO Enrollment          -0.19*** 
(0.03) 
    -1.26*** 
(0.07) 
-0.82** 
(0.27) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size: 45,690 10,719 614 
Avg. Monthly 
Spending: 
$160.21 $231.16 $2,476.60 
Marginal Effect: -17% -72% -56% 
 KHS 
 Log Spending on 
Professional Visits 
Log Spending on 
Outpatient Visits 
Log Spending on 
Inpatient Visits 
  (1b)  (2b)  (3b) 
HMO Enrollment      -0.10*** 
(0.02) 
    -0.36*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.38* 
(0.20) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size: 141,377  37,029  1,714  
Avg. Monthly 
Spending: 
$134.48 $225.09 $2,987.70 
Marginal Effect: -9% -30% -31% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet 
for Health and Family Services. Notes: These regressions are estimated using OLS and include 
monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Three stars, two stars, and one star 
imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Large Health Care Spenders 
 Passport 
 
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more on 
professional visits during month 
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more on 
outpatient visits during month 
HMO 
   -0.060*** 
(0.005) 
    -0.050*** 
(0.002) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. Monthly 
Utilization Rate: 18.7% 4.3% 
Percent Change: -32% -92% 
 
KHS 
 Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more on 
professional visits during month 
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more on 
outpatient visits during month 
HMO 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. Monthly 
Utilization Rate: 17.34% 5.11% 
Percent Change: 9% -37% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: Sample 
includes all 4,706 children from the Passport sample, for all 30 months. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter 
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 10 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Well Child Utilization – Intensive and Extensive Margins 
 Passport 
 Any 
Well Child Visits? 
Number of 
Well Child Visits 
   (1a)  (1b) 
HMO Enrollment     0.011*** 
(0.002) 
     0.287*** 
(0.048) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Sample Size: 141,180 73,020 
Pre-Reform Avg. Monthly Utilization Rate 4%  
Percent Change: 31%  
 KHS 
 Any 
Well Child Visits? 
Number of 
Well Child Visits 
  (2a)  (2b) 
HMO Enrollment      0.004*** 
(0.001) 
     0.127*** 
(0.024) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Sample Size: 407,700 226,770 
Pre-Reform Avg. Monthly Utilization Rate 5%  
Percent Change: 9%  
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: These 
regressions also include monthly controls for child age. The regressions on the left are estimated as linear probability models using OLS and the 
regressions on the right are estimated as Poisson models.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically 
significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 11A 
The Impact of Passport Managed Care on Asthmatic Children and All Other Children 
 (1) 
Original Treatment 
and Control Counties 
(2) 
All 16 Passport Counties 
versus All 19 Region 4 Counties 
(3) 
All 16 Passport Counties 
versus All 19 Region 2 and  
All 12 Region 4 Counties 
 Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Any Professional 
Visits? 
   -0.238*** 
(0.019) 
   -0.155*** 
(0.005) 
   -0.130*** 
(0.007) 
   -0.071*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.141*** 
(0.006) 
   -0.073*** 
(0.001) 
Baseline Rate: 57% 35% 54% 29% 55% 30% 
Percent Change: -42% -44% -24% -24% -26% -24% 
       
Any Outpatient 
Visits? 
   -0.107*** 
(0.013) 
   -0.052*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.051*** 
(0.005) 
   -0.030*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.056*** 
(0.004) 
   -0.032*** 
(0.001) 
Baseline Rate: 17% 8% 17% 7% 17% 7% 
Percent Change: -63% -65% -30% -43% -33% -46% 
       
Any Inpatient 
Visits? 
-0.0001 
(0.005) 
   -0.0014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
   -0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
   -0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
Baseline Rate: 3.0% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 
Percent Change: -.4% -36% -16% -16% -11% -17% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The 
OLS regressions in this table estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The first set of results divides the sample of 4,706 children into asthmatic 
children (N = 323), and all others (N = 4,383). The second set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 2,027 asthmatic children 
compared to 31,305 other children. The final set of results examines 2,447 asthmatic children compared to 38,840 other children. Three stars, two 
stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 11B 
The Impact of KHS Managed Care on Asthmatic Children and All Other Children 
 (1) 
Original Treatment 
and Control Counties 
(2) 
All 16 KHS Counties 
versus All 33 Region 7 and 8 Counties 
(3) 
All 16 KHS Counties 
versus All 39 Region 6, 7 and 8 
Counties 
 Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Any Professional 
Visits? 
0.021 
(0.022) 
   0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
   0.004 
(0.002) 
         -0.008 
(0.011) 
   0.004* 
(0.002) 
Baseline Rate: 59% 34% 58% 33% 58% 33% 
Percent Change: 4% 6% -2% 1% -1% 1% 
       
Any Outpatient 
Visits? 
  -0.045*** 
 (0.014) 
   -0.015*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
   -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
   -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Baseline Rate: 21% 9% 21% 10% 21% 10% 
Percent Change: -21% -16% -10% -8% -9% -8% 
       
Any Inpatient 
Visits? 
-0.0006 
(0.004) 
   0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
     0.0074*** 
(0.002) 
   0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
Baseline Rate: 2.0% 0.4% 3.3% 0.5% 3.3% 0.5% 
Percent Change: -3% 16% 24% 12% 23% 11% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The 
OLS regressions in this table estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The first set of results divides the sample of 13,590 children into asthmatic 
children (N = 664), and all others (N = 12,926). The second set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 4,168 asthmatic children 
compared to 47,374 other children. The final set of results examines 4,481 asthmatic children compared to 51,833 other children. Three stars, two 
stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 12 Specification Check – Allow for Partial Enrollment 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Extensive Margin 
 Passport 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
  OLS 
(1a) 
IV 
(1b) 
OLS 
(2a) 
IV 
(2b) 
OLS 
(3a) 
IV 
(3b) 
HMO Enrollment          -0.141*** 
(0.005) 
    -0.158*** 
(0.005) 
    -0.047 *** 
(0.003) 
    -0.052*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
 (0.001) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
35% 35% 9% 9% 0.7% 0.7% 
Percent Change: -40% -45% -52% -57% -1% 4% 
 KHS 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
 OLS 
(1c) 
IV 
(1d) 
OLS 
(2c) 
IV 
(2d) 
OLS 
(3c) 
IV 
(3d) 
HMO Enrollment      0.013*** 
(0.003) 
     0.007** 
(0.003) 
    -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
    -0.019*** 
(0.002) 
 0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
34% 34% 10% 10% 0.6% 0.6% 
Percent Change:  4% 2% -14% -19% 5% 7% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: These 
regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 8,693 children followed for 
up to 30 months (N = 234,058), while the KHS regressions include 23,825 children followed for up to 30 months (N = 646,820). Three stars, two 
stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
  
Table 13 Specification Check – Allow for Non-Border Counties 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Extensive Margin 
 
Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
HMO Enrollment in Passport 
    -0.159 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.055*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
HMO Enrollment in KHS 
     0.021*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.061*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
HMO Enrollment – Combined Regions 
    -0.035*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
HMO Enrollment – All 120 Counties, Combined Regions 
    -0.043*** 
(0.001) 
    -0.022*** 
(0.001) 
  0.0002 
(0.0002) 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: All 
models estimated using our OLS specification. The results for Passport and KHS are for the specification in Table 6. There are 4,706 observations for 
the Passport specification, 13,590 for the KHS specification, 18,296 for the Combined Regions specification, and 101,649 for the All Counties, 
Combined Regions specification. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 
  
 Table 14 Specification Check – Restrict Post-Reform Timeframe to 12 Months 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization - Extensive Margin 
 Passport 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
  OLS 
(1a) 
IV 
(1b) 
OLS 
(2a) 
IV 
(2b) 
OLS 
(3a) 
IV 
(3b) 
HMO Enrollment -0.139*** 
(0.007) 
    -0.147*** 
(0.009) 
    -0.026 *** 
(0.004) 
    -0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
 (0.001) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6% 
Percent Change: -38% -41% -29% -35% 20% 10% 
 KHS 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
 OLS 
(1c) 
IV 
(1d) 
OLS 
(2c) 
IV 
(2d) 
OLS 
(3c) 
IV 
(3d) 
HMO Enrollment      0.021*** 
(0.004) 
     0.015*** 
(0.005) 
    -0.019*** 
(0.002) 
    -0.022*** 
(0.003) 
 0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5% 
Percent Change:  6% 4% -19% -22% 9% 13% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family 
Services. Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport 
regressions include 4,706 children followed for 22 months (N = 103,532), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children 
followed for 22 months (N = 298,980). Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 15 Specification Check – Testing Common Pre-Reform Trends Assumption 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization – Extensive Margin 
 
Passport 
 
Any Professional Visits? Any Outpatient Visits? Any Inpatient Visits? 
 
1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 
HMO enrollment -0.159*** -0.055*** -0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001) 
treatment x month 1 interaction -0.012 -0.006 0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003) 
treatment x month 2 interaction 0.012 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.003) 
treatment x month 3 interaction 0.014 0.014 0.0000 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002) 
treatment x month4  interaction 0.019 0.010 -0.002 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002) 
treatment x month 5 interaction 0.010 -0.004 0.004 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002) 
treatment x month 6 interaction -0.025* 0.0002 0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002) 
treatment x month 7 interaction -0.011 0.001 0.003* 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002) 
treatment x month 8 interaction -0.013 -0.006 -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.008) (0.002) 
F test that all interactions are equal to 0: 
  
Fstat 1.41 0.72 1.48 
Pvalue 0.1849 0.6722 0.1583 
    
 
KHS 
 
Any Professional Visits? Any Outpatient Visits? Any Inpatient Visits? 
 
1(b) 2(b) 3(b) 
HMO enrollment 0.0003 -0.015*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
treatment x month 1 interaction -0.0023* -0.004 0.006 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
treatment x month 2 interaction -0.0002 0.004 0.014 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
treatment x month 3 interaction -0.0033** -0.001 0.024* 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
treatment x month4  interaction 0.00001 0.003 0.021** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009) 
treatment x month 5 interaction -0.0005 0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
treatment x month 6 interaction -0.0001 0.0005 0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) 
treatment x month 7 interaction 0.0005 0.009 0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) 
treatment x month 8 interaction 0.0003 0.008 -0.009 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) 
F test that all interactions are equal to 0: 
  
 Fstat 1.12 0.7 3.98 
Pvalue 0.3452 0.6924 0.0001 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family 
Services. Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age and interaction terms between indicators for each 
of the first eight months in the data (pre-reform time period) and an indicator for those in the treatment group in each region. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4,706 children followed for 30 months (N = 141,180), while the 
KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months (N = 407,700). Three stars, two stars, and one star imply 
statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Table 1 
Services Covered by the State Capitation Payments to the Plans 
Capitated Services Excluded Services 
Inpatient Hospital Services  Dental Services  Mental Hospitals 
Outpatient Hospital Services  Medical Transportation  Psychiatrists 
Urgent and Emergency Services  EPSDT Services Psychiatric Beds (Inpatient Hospital) 
Outpatient Surgical Services  Vision Care Non-Emergency Transportation (Mental Health) 
Medical services provided by:  Preventive Health Services provided by: AIS/MR Services 
• Physicians  • Public Health Departments ICF/MR 
• Advanced Practice RNs  •  FQHCs Targeted Case Management (Behavioral Health) 
• Physician Assistants  • Rural Health Centers Home and Community-Based Waiver Services 
• FQHCs  Hearing Services (under age 21) Certain Medicare-Only Services: 
• Primary Care Centers  Durable Medical Equipment • CORF Services 
• Rural Health Clinics  Alternative Birthing Services • Chiropractors 
Laboratory  Podiatry Services • Physicians Assistant 
X-rays  Family Planning Clinic Services • Physical and Occupational Therapy 
Appropriate Escort Meals and Lodging  Renal Dialysis • Psychologist 
Therapeutic Evaluation and Treatment:  Hospice Services • Clinical Social Worker 
• Physical Therapy  Organ Transplant Services Nursing Facility Services 
• Speech Therapy Specialized Case Management for Children and 
Adults with Complex Conditions 
EPSDT Special Services (Behavioral Health) 
• Occupational Therapy Behavioral Health (Limited to PCP) School-Based Services for Disabled Students 
Home Health Services  Medical Detoxification Early Intervention Services for Infants and Toddlers 
with Disabilities 
Pharmacy and Limited OTC Drugs        
Source: Bartosch and Haber (2004) 
 
  
 Append Table 2 
First Stage Regression Results of Monthly HMO Enrollment on HMO Eligibility 
  Passport Program KHS Program 
Child is Eligible For Managed Care 
(Based On Initial County of Residence 
and Time Period) 
     0.690*** 
(0.002) 
     0.789*** 
(0.001) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
R2 0.69 0.75 
# children 4,706 13,590 
# child - months 141,180 407,700 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. 
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Three stars, two stars, and one star 
imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Figure 1 – Kentucky’s 8 Regions, Including Passport Counties (Region 3) and Kentucky Health Select (Region 5) 
 
Figure 2 – The Final Study Counties 
 
 Figure 3 Child Healthcare Utilization Before and After Passport 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
Passport % Monthly Outpatient Utilization (Jan 1997-June 1999) 
Control
Treatment
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Passport % Monthly Professional Utilization (Jan 1997-June 1999) 
Control
Treatment
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
Passport % Monthly Inpatient Utilization (Jan 1997-June 1999) 
Control
Treatment
 Figure 4 Child Healthcare Utilization Before and After KHS 
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 Figure 5 Healthcare Utilization In Bordering Passport and KHS Counties 
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 Figure 6A 
Monthly Count of Unique Medicaid Provider Identifiers in Passport (Treatment) and non-Passport (Control) Counties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6B 
Monthly Count of Unique Medicaid Provider Identifiers in KHS (Treatment) and non-KHS (Control) Counties 
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